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Abstract 
The German energy sector’s transition toward the more distributed production of en-
ergy has given rise to various forms of decentralized energy production. Within the 
framework of decentralized infrastructure, the relation between the involved agents is 
often characterized by a high degree of social proximity. Thus, the spatial and social 
closeness usually emphasizes aspects of decision-making such as pro-social behav-
ior that can have significant effects on the involved parties’ response to agency prob-
lems and their investment incentives. 
This essay applies behavioral economics’ finding on so-called social preferences to 
fundamental insights from incomplete contract theory regarding economic agents’ 
investment behavior. Specifically, it will be analyzed how a contractor’s investment 
incentives develop in a public-private partnership setting given incomplete contracts 
when the contractor disposes of preferences for distributional fairness. It will be 
shown that the investment incentives of the contractor are significantly different from 
those of the standard model assuming neoclassical preferences. Another important 
finding is that in contrast to the standard model in which only the allocation of proper-
ty rights can set different investment incentives, payments can also influence an eco-
nomic agent’s behavior when social preferences apply as the distribution of pay-
ments determines whether the psychological influences of envy or a sense of guilt 
are affecting the contractor. 
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 List of abbreviations 
 
PPP   public-private partnership 
PPPs   public-private partnerships 
 
 
 
  
 List of symbols  
 
  parameter reflecting the extent of the aversion against disadvantageous 
distributional inequality (“sense of envy”) 
B   (gross) benefit to society from running a specific infrastructure 
0B   fixed basic benefit amount that arises when an infrastructure is finished 
   parameter reflecting the extent of the aversion against advantageous 
distributional inequality 
C  total costs from running a specific infrastructure, borne by the actor who 
operates the infrastructure 
0C  fixed basic cost that accrues when operating the infrastructure 
c  productivity parameter that has an influence on unproductive invest-
ments within the cost function C  of operating the infrastructure  
( )c e  function of unproductive investments that has an impact on the overall 
costs C  of operating the infrastructure (only relevant in the Hart (2003) 
model) 
e   unverifiable amount of unproductive investment by the contractor 
*e   first-best/ optimal amount for unproductive investment by the contractor 
maxe  possible maximum amount of unproductive investments contractor can 
make in a specific scenario 
ê   unproductive investments made by the contractor in the unbundling 
case without social preferences (as in the Hart (2003) model) 
êˆ  unproductive investments made by the contractor in the PPP case with-
out social preferences (as in the Hart (2003) model) 
PPPspê  unproductive investments made by the contractor in the PPP case when 
social preferences are relevant 
Uspê  unproductive investments made by the contractor in the unbundling 
case when social preferences are relevant 
  productivity parameter that has an influence on productive investments 
within the cost function C  of operating the infrastructure 
 ( )i  function of productive investments that has an impact on the overall 
costs C  of operating the infrastructure (only relevant in the Hart (2003) 
model) 
i    unverifiable amount of productive investment by the contractor 
*i   first-best/ optimal amount for productive investment by the contractor 
maxi   possible maximum amount of productive investments contractor can 
make in a specific scenario 
î  productive investments made by a contractor in the unbundling case 
without social preferences (as in the Hart (2003) model) 
îˆ  productive investments made by the contractor in the PPP case without 
social preferences (as in the Hart (2003) model) 
PPPspî  productive investments made by the contractor in the PPP case when 
social preferences are relevant 
Uspî  productive investments made by the contractor in the unbundling case 
when social preferences are relevant  
o  productivity parameter that has an influence on unproductive invest-
ments within the gross benefit function of the society B  
( )o e  function of unproductive investments that has an impact on the overall 
benefit to society B  (only relevant in the Hart (2003) model) 
   productivity parameter that has an influence on productive investments 
within the gross benefit function of the society B   
( )i   function of productive investments that has an impact on the overall 
benefit to society B  (only relevant in the Hart (2003) model) 
0P   fixed payment for the construction of the infrastructure 
t    point in time with [0, 1, 2]t    
.contrTC  total construction costs of the contractor 
PPP SPC
U

 utility function of the contractor in the PPP case, with social preferences 
, 1PPP SPC P
U

 utility function of the contractor in the PPP case, when public authority’s 
net payoffs are higher than the contractor’s (i.e. the “envy” case) 
, 2PPP SPC P
U

 utility function of the contractor in the PPP case, when public authority’s 
net payoffs are lower than the contractor’s (i.e. the “sense of guilt” case) 
 UNB SPC
U

 utility function of the contractor in the unbundling case, with social pref-
erences 
, 1UNB SPC U
U

 utility function of the contractor in the unbundling case, when public au-
thority’s net payoffs are higher than the contractor’s (i.e. the “envy” 
case) 
, 2UNB SPC U
U

 utility function of the contractor in the unbundling case, when public au-
thority’s net payoffs are lower than the contractor’s (i.e. the “sense of 
guilt” case) 
.( , )SocU e i  the society’s utility function (net benefit), reproducing the economic ex-
change between contractor and public authority and depending on the 
contractor’s investments e  and i  
PPPC
V  net payoffs of the contractor in the PPP case; equal to the contractor’s 
utility function without social preferences 
UNBC
V  net payoffs of a contractor in the unbundling case, equal to the contrac-
tor’s utility function without social preferences 
PPPPA
V   net payoffs of the public authority in the PPP case 
UNBPA
V   net payoffs of the public authority in the unbundling case 
 
 
 
  
 1. Introduction 
The transition of the energy sector toward the broader use of renewable energy 
sources has introduced new technologies, regulatory regimes, and business models; 
and led to a reconfiguration of governance strategies within urban as well as rural 
areas (Monstadt 2007).1 These governance patterns involve a variety of stakeholders 
– for example, the administration as strategy and framework setter, local authorities 
that implement regional energy policy, established energy suppliers trying to adapt 
their business model, new energy companies entering the market, institutional and 
strategic investors, the industry as one of the main consumers, and citizens who are 
nowadays not only another important group of consumers but also urged to play a 
bigger role in energy decisions through various forms of participation mechanisms 
(e.g. Devine-Wright 2005; Yildiz 2013). Against this background, strategies and gov-
ernance approaches such as the distributed generation of energy (e.g. Pepermans et 
al. 2005; Alanne and Saari 2006; Karger and Hennings 2009), re-municipalization of 
existing infrastructure (e.g. Hall et al. 2013; Becker et al. 2015), and development of 
business models allowing for the financial participation of citizens (e.g. Yildiz 2014; 
Höfer and Rommel 2015; Yildiz et al. 2015) have gained particular attention. 
Among these strategies, public-private partnerships (PPPs) are also a relevant gov-
ernance approach to realizing renewable energy projects (e.g. Martins et al. 2011). 
Particularly for developing countries, PPPs promise to provide relief to constraints 
such as insufficient government investments due to limited public budgets, difficulties 
in mobilizing financial resources among citizens, or limited interest from the private 
sector due to project finance risks, since PPPs can allocate project risks between 
several parties (Sovacool 2013). Decisive for the functioning and performance of 
public-private partnership (PPP) relationships are complex contractual agreements 
between the involved parties. Here, the institutional framework given by the underly-
ing contracts affects the involved parties’ behavior and investment incentives, and 
therefore determines the agreements’ efficiency (Saussier et al. 2009). 
The new institutional economics literature, particularly the strand on property rights 
theory, dedicates substantial work to the question of the design of the institutional 
setting of PPPs and its effect on the behavior of actors involved in a PPP (e.g., Hart 
et al. 1997; Shleifer 1998; Hart 2003). This essay contributes to this strand of litera-
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 For further reading on socio-technical transitions such as the transition of the energy sector, see e.g., 
Smith et al. (2005), Meadowcroft (2009), and Foxon et al. (2010). 
 ture by analyzing the investment behavior of involved parties through a theoretical 
analysis model.  
The distinctive feature of the approach presented here is the link to insights from be-
havioral economics. According to this research strand, some economic agents dis-
pose of a preference set that is different from the assumptions of neoclassical eco-
nomics, that is, their behavior is determined by so-called social preferences (e.g. 
Fehr and Schmidt 1999). By including preferences for distributional fairness among 
involved parties in the analysis, the model presented here aims to simulate a prefer-
ence set that might for example be relevant in the context of decentralized infrastruc-
ture which is the result of tendencies in the renewable energy sector toward a more 
dispersed generation approach. Therefore, this paper relates to prior work from Fehr 
et al. (2008) who theoretically analyzed entities that are organized as partnerships 
such as law offices, consulting companies, and advertising agencies.  
In order to analyze the effects of preferences for distributional fairness in PPPs, this 
essay is structured as follows: the following section provides an overview on funda-
mental insights from incomplete contract theory and its applications to PPPs, and 
describes briefly central findings from behavioral economics in order to provide a ra-
tionale on how to extend incomplete contract theory. Section 3 introduces the model, 
then in section 4 the analysis is conducted. Section 5 supports the theoretical analy-
sis with a numerical example. Finally, this paper ends with concluding remarks and 
suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Literature review 
Economic theory offers a large number of explanatory models and analytical frame-
works to address the various complex exchange processes that are subsumed under 
the term economy (Buchanan 1984). One of the most prominent domains within eco-
nomic theory is the analysis of economic exchange through different organizational 
settings. Dating back to the seminal work of Ronald Coase (1937), often referenced 
under the headword “Theory of the Firm” numerous authors have analyzed and dis-
cussed coordination mechanisms ranging from market transactions to hierarchically 
organized entities (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Williamson 1975). In this context, 
central questions arise about the reasons for the existence and use of specific coor-
dination mechanisms given a specific economic exchange. Further questions ad-
dress the effects of an institutional setting (e.g. the specification of property rights) on 
 an economic agent’s behavior within a specific organizational framework (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). 
The latter subject is particularly prominent in the literature under the name of incom-
plete contract theory. Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart (1986) were among the first 
to analyze the relation between contracts, contractual incompleteness, the allocation 
of property rights, and the effects of this allocation on an economic agent’s invest-
ment incentives. As it is practically impossible to write a contract that includes subject 
terms for all possible future states of nature, the allocation of property rights is a cru-
cial element. Property rights assign control in those cases where the contract is not 
specified. Hence, in cases where the so-called hold-up problem2 prevents economic 
agents from making investments, the allocation of property rights provides invest-
ment incentives for the owner. To sum up, the general finding from incomplete con-
tract theory is that the economic agent “whose investments are more important (in 
the sense of their marginal impacts on the default payoffs) should be the owner” 
(Schmitz 2001: 11) of all assets relevant to the economic exchange. Through this 
allocation, a second-best equilibrium can be realized (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1986; 
Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995; Schmitz 2001). 
The rationale underlying incomplete contract theory has also been applied to the 
question of privatization and PPPs (e.g., Laffont and Tirole 1991; Schmidt 1996; Hart 
et al. 1997; Hart 2003; see Schönfeld (2011) for a more detailed list with further ex-
planations on the respective models). A general statement on theoretical insights on 
the allocation of property rights in the context of privatization and PPPs is difficult as 
the various models include specific scenarios with specific assumptions. Examples 
are the focus on the provision of public goods through PPPs (e.g. Besley and Ghatak 
2001; Francesconi and Muthoo 2006) and the effects of various organizational mod-
els on the costs and service quality when realizing and operating infrastructure (Hart 
et al. 1997; Chalkley and Malcomson 1998; Hart 2003). Though a vague conclusion 
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 The so-called hold-up problem describes a problem set in which an economic agent does not invest 
efficiently in an economic exchange. Short-term contracts and contractual incompleteness can prevent 
economic agents from making relation-specific investments as they fear that their share in the eco-
nomic exchange’s rents could be extracted by an opportunistically acting exchange partner who ex-
post (i.e. after realizing the economic exchange that was agreed on in a contract) demands re-
negotiations. In general, ex-post negotiations on the allocation of the exchange’s rents would be effi-
cient according to the Coase theorem (see e.g. Coase 1960 and Schweizer 1988 for necessary condi-
tions for the Coase theorem to hold) but with the threat of being exploited, strategies to incentivize 
parties to join a relationship ex-ante have to be developed. In this context, the allocation of property 
rights represents a measure to induce ex-ante efficient investment incentives for an economic agent 
and to join an economic relationship as these property rights determine the bargaining power in the 
ex-post negotiations (Schmitz 2001). 
 is that the right to build and operate infrastructure leads to the internalization of the 
costs of operation by a contractor. Hence, a contractor would put significant efforts in 
reducing operating costs (and service quality) so that an ordering party has to con-
sider to which extent it can specify the service quality. If the ordering party (i.e. the 
public authority) can specify well the required service quality, then it should assign 
both, construction and operation, to one party (Schönfeld 2011). 
The previous descriptions highlighted the importance of property rights in an incom-
plete contract setting in which ownership serves as a device to respond to the threat 
of opportunistic behavior. Underlying to this threat are the assumptions from neo-
classical economics that have their origin in a set of a priori notions on the behavior 
of agents opposed to an economic problem (e.g., an exchange with other agents). 
One central characteristic of this theory is that economic agents evaluate all existing 
(action) alternatives by the utility they expect from the outcomes of a specific decision 
whereby the utility is exclusively determined by monetary payoffs. Then, economic 
agents always decide for the alternative that maximizes their expected utility (Simon 
1998). With recent trends toward a broader diffusion of experimental methods in 
economics and the growing influence of insights from other disciplines, particularly 
the cognitive sciences, the viewpoint is increasingly supported that the explanatory 
and predictive power of economic analysis can be improved by extending the stand-
ard assumption set from neoclassical economics. This development has led to the 
establishment of so-called behavioral economics, which defines its assumptions ac-
cording to evidence generated by experiments, field studies, and research methods 
from cognitive sciences such as brain scans (Camerer and Loewenstein 2004). 
An important strand within behavioral economics addresses the question of an eco-
nomic agent’s utility assessment and influencing factors besides monetary payoffs. 
According to this perspective, findings from experimental game theory (Roth et al. 
1981; Güth et al. 1982; Binmore et al. 1985) suggest that some (but not all) economic 
agents do not behave in a self-interest maximizing manner but are also influenced by 
behavioral patterns such as reciprocity (e.g. Rabin 1993), altruism (e.g. Khalil 2004), 
or preferences for distributional fairness (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999) (Fehr and 
Schmidt 2006). These patterns, so-called social preferences, are dependent on the 
context of the economic exchange. The framework of the exchange determines the 
character of social interactions, the economic agents’ scope of action, and the way in 
which information is processed. Thus, in market-like organizational contexts in which 
 relationships are characterized by rather loose personal contacts, social preferences 
play a subordinated role. In contrast, social interactions are rather tight in non-market 
settings so that social preferences are more likely to influence an economic agent’s 
utility assessment and consequently his behavior (Bowles 1998). 
The insights on social preferences are latterly incorporated into incomplete contract 
theory in order to analyze the investment incentives of ownership in contexts that are 
characterized by strong social ties between involved actors. In this regard, findings 
from theoretical and experimental analysis reveal that among agents with social pref-
erences, ownership allocation schemes set different incentives than those in the 
standard model – that is, joint ownership sets higher incentives than concentration of 
ownership (Fehr et al. 2008), Findings in the context of PPPs that include insights on 
social preferences do not exist so far. However, actual business models and govern-
ance approaches in the energy sector (e.g. decentralization, citizen participation 
schemes) provide a framework in which social preferences might be relevant. Hence, 
the following section introduces a model in which the impact of social preferences on 
investment behavior in a PPP setting is analyzed. 
 
3. The model 
The model presented here has its roots in the Hart (2003) model which analyzes the 
effects of different ownership structures on the costs and benefits of PPPs. In fact, 
the presented model extends Hart’s (2003) model by including preferences for distri-
butional fairness. The scenario modeled here takes place in a decentralized context. 
As a consequence, a socially proximate relationship between the economic agents is 
assumed so that the involved agents dispose of preferences for distributional fairness 
(see also section 2 for a more detailed rationale to include social preferences in the 
analysis).  
As in the original model of Hart (2003) two actors – a contractor (e.g., a construction 
firm) and an ordering party (e.g. the public authority) – are involved in an economic 
exchange. The purpose of their exchange is the construction and, as an additional 
option, the operation of a specific service (e.g., infrastructure, or a prison as in Hart’s 
(2003) model, etc.).3 Accordingly, the time line (Fig.1) covers three dates: the date 
when the underlying contract between the contractor and the ordering party is agreed 
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 In the following, the model will describe, analyze, and discuss a PPP scenario. Therefore, the word-
ing is adapted to this purpose, i.e. the public authority is set as the “ordering party” and the underlying 
“service” is the construction (and the operation) of an infrastructure project. 
 on and signed (t=0), the date when the underlying service with its basic characteris-
tics is delivered by the contractor (t=1), and a final date that marks the end of the op-
erational phase (t=2) (Hart 2003). 
 
  
t=0  construction phase            t=1  operational phase     t=2 
Fig.1: Time line of the analyzed economic exchange. 
(Source: Author’s design, adapted from Hart 2003). 
 
The (construction) contract that is underlying to the provision of the infrastructure is 
incomplete (see e.g. Grosman and Hart 1986). That means the contract parties de-
fine basic elements of the required service but the constructor can still modify other 
specific details related to his service without violating the agreement between both 
parties. These specific details, 0i   being the unverifiable amount of productive in-
vestment by the contractor and 0e   being the unverifiable amount of unproductive 
investment by the contractor, depending on the decision of the constructor, cannot be 
verified by a third party and consequently cannot be contracted on, and form together 
the contractor’s total construction cost .contrTC i e  . Furthermore, they are of par-
ticular importance as they influence the costs and benefits to society when the infra-
structure is in use (Hart 2003). Accordingly, the costs and benefits of the operational 
phase in this model are defined as follows: 
 
0 * *B B i o e        (1) 
0 * *C C i c e        (2) 
with , , ,o c   being strictly positive so that the related terms are linear functions.
4 
 
Equation (1) represents the (gross) benefit B that a society has from operating the 
infrastructure, measured in monetary terms. It comprises a fixed basic benefit 0B , a 
function of productive investments *i , and a function of unproductive investments 
*o e . With regard to the benefit to society, productive investments i  raise the quality 
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 In the Hart (2003) model, the assumptions , , , 0o c   , ', ', ', ' 0o c   , '', '', '' 0c   , and 
'' 0o   apply. In this model, linear production functions were assumed for the sake of simplicity. As 
the model aims to show fundamental trends in the contractor’s investment behavior when including 
social preferences, this simplification avoids problems regarding concavity of the utility function and 
changes that arise from the variation of the applying psychological effect. 
 of the service realized through the infrastructure and therefore the benefit to society. 
In contrast, unproductive investments e  reduce the quality of the service and there-
fore the overall benefit to society. Equation (2) represents the costs C  of operating 
the infrastructure. Here, the components are a fixed amount of basic costs 0C , a 
function of productive investments *i , and a function of unproductive investments 
*c e . Both types of investment, productive and unproductive investments, reduce the 
total costs (Hart 2003). 
The objective function is to maximize the net benefit of the economic exchange (i.e. 
the society’s net benefit) .( , )SocU e i . Hence, in the first-best scenario i  and e  are cho-
sen to maximize the following equation: 
. . 0 0( , ) * * * * *Soc contrU e i B C TC B i o e C i c e i e              (3) 
 
In order to be consistent with the Hart (2003) model, the following additional condi-
tions also apply: 
 1    
 1c o  . 
 
Hence, we arrive at the socially optimal result (the “first-best”) in the corner solutions 
where max* [0; ]i Max i  and * 0e   (Hart 2003). 
So far, this model and the related explanations are similar to the Hart (2003) model. 
The preferences for distributional fairness become important when considering the 
second-best scenario. The builder’s investments cannot be verified and therefore 
cannot be contracted on. However, the contractor knows the exact amount of his 
costs i  and e . Consequently, the allocation of property rights (i.e., the assignment of 
the right to operate the infrastructure between 1t   and 2t  ) has an influence on the 
contractor’s investment behavior (Hart 2003).  
In the following, two cases will be distinguished, a first case in which the construction 
and the operation of the infrastructure are assigned to different actors (“unbundling” 
case) and another case, in which the infrastructure is operated by the same agent 
that constructed it (“PPP” case). These two cases are sub-divided into a case that 
describes the (neoclassical) standard model as in Hart (2003) and a model in which 
the contractor has preferences for distributional fairness. 
 
 3.1. The unbundling case 
In the unbundling case, the contractor receives a fixed payment 0P  for the construc-
tion of the infrastructure and bears the costs for the investments i  and e . Hence, his 
net payoffs (that are equal to his utility when psychological effects do not apply) are  
0UNBC
V P i e        (4) 
 
and at date 0t  , the contractor’s objective is to choose i  and e  to solve: 
0( ) ( )UNBCMax V Max P i e  
.   (5) 
 
The net payoffs of the commanding party (i.e., public authority) include the benefit to 
society B , the costs of operating the plant C , and the fixed payment 0P . Hence, the 
public authority’s payoffs from operating the plant are: 
0 0 0 0* * * *UNBPAV B C P B i o e C i c e P              (6) 
 
In the original paper of Hart (2003), the net payoff function of the public authority in 
the unbundling case 
UNBPA
V  is slightly different as 0P i e   is set. Underlying this equa-
tion is the assumption that there is competition in the market for contractors and 
therefore the public authority can set the fixed price 0P  for the service just high 
enough to cover the contractor’s costs, the investments i  and e . However, in this 
model, it is assumed that there is no competition among contractors. In fact, the con-
text of decentralized infrastructure that is set as a framework of this model reasons 
that there is only one contractor and consequently no competition. In return, the so-
cially close context of the economic exchange results in preferences for distributional 
fairness among the involved parties. 
Including preferences for distributional fairness changes the utility function of in-
volved agents significantly. For the further course of the analysis, the utility function 
of the contractor is of particular interest. In reference to Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) 
approach to including preferences for distributional fairness in an economic agent’s 
utility function, the utility function of a contractor with social preferences 
UNB SPC
U

 is as 
follows: 
*max{ ,0} *max{ ,0}
UNB SP UNB UNB UNB UNB UNBC C PA C C PA
U V V V V V 

       (7) 
 
 with   reflecting the extent of the contractor’s aversion to disadvantageous distribu-
tional inequality (i.e., “envy”) and   reflecting the extent of the contractor’s aversion 
to advantageous distributional inequality (i.e., “sense of guilt”). Accordingly, the sec-
ond term as a whole covers a reduction of the contractor’s utility due to disadvanta-
geous distributional inequality, and the third term a reduction of the contractor’s utility 
due to advantageous distributional inequality. As in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
model, both inequality parameters are , 0    where , 0    would imply that the 
contractor has preferences according to the standard (neoclassical) model. Further-
more, it is assumed that   , which implies that in social comparisons, the aver-
sion to disadvantageous distributional inequality is at least as high as the sense of 
guilt that arises when the analyzed agent (i.e., the contractor) is better off than his 
reference agent (Fehr and Schmidt 1999).5 
 
3.2. The PPP case 
In the PPP case, the contractor is allocated the rights to operate the infrastructure.6 
Hence, the contractor now internalizes the costs of the operation phase C  so that his 
net payoffs assuming standard (neoclassical) preferences (as in Hart 2003) include 
his fixed payment 0P  and the relevant cost item, the total operational costs ( , )C e i  
and the investments i  and e : 
0 0 0 * *PPPCV P C i e P C i c e i e            (8) 
 
Accordingly, the public authority’s payoffs are determined by the benefit to society of 
realizing infrastructure B  and the fixed compensation 
0P  that it has to pay to the con-
tractor for his service to construct the infrastructure: 
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 The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model makes further assumptions on the inequality parameters. An 
example is the restriction of the range of the  -parameter to 0 1  , which is introduced in order to 
reflect that 1  implies an economic agent who would throw away some of his monetary payoffs in 
order to reduce advantageous inequality, which is not very plausible (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Some 
of these additional assumptions as well as plausible numeric values for the inequality parameters   
and   will be discussed in section 4.3. 
6
 In Hart’s (2003) model, the contractor has either the possibility to operate the infrastructure by him-
self or sub-contract this service to a sub-contractor. As there is competition on the market of sub-
contractors, the payments to the sub-contractor can be set equal to the costs of operating the infra-
structure 
0 * *C C i c e   . In the decentralized context of this model, it is simply assumed that the 
contractor provides the service by himself. Alternatively, one could also apply the same rationale as in 
the Hart (2003) model, i.e. the assignment to a sub-contractor, which is chosen among several alter-
natives in a competitive market. 
 0 0 0* *PPPPAV B P B i o e P         (9) 
 
As in the unbundling case, it is also necessary to determine the utility of the contrac-
tor, given preferences for distributional fairness. Again, differences regarding the dis-
tribution of net payoffs, either advantageous or disadvantageous, have a negative 
effect on the contractor’s utility: 
*max{ ,0} *max{ ,0}
PPP SP PPP PPP PPP PPP PPPC C PA C C PA
U V V V V V 

          (10) 
 
With the necessary net payoffs and utility functions defined, the effects of different 
ownership structures on the investment behavior of the contractor can now be ana-
lyzed. 
 
4. Theoretical assessment of contractor behavior given preferences for distri-
butional fairness 
In the model of Hart (2003), the public authority has to consider a trade-off when 
making its decision. In the unbundling case, neither productive investments i  nor 
unproductive investments e  are made since the contractor does not internalize the 
social benefit B  nor the costs of the operation phase C . Regarding unproductive 
investments, 0ê   corresponds to the first-best solution * 0e  . However, 0î   repre-
sents an underinvestment in productive investments as the first-best here is the solu-
tion to the first-order condition '( *) '( *) 1i i    where * 0i  .7 In the PPP case of 
Hart’s (2003) model, the investment behavior of the contractor is significantly differ-
ent. As the infrastructure’s operating agent, the contractor now internalizes the costs 
of the operation phase C . Consequently, the contractor now invests in both, produc-
tive and unproductive investments. While it is clear that any investment in unproduc-
tive terms e  is sub-optimal from a social perspective ( ˆ 0 *ê e  ), a look at the first-
order conditions ( ˆ'( ) 1î  ) reveals that the investments made in productive invest-
                                                 
7
 As the Hart (2003) model does not limit its analysis to a setting with linear functions, the first-best is 
the solution to the first-order condition '( *) '( *) 1i i    where * 0i  . The analogous solution for 
the model presented here is 
max* [0; ]i Max i  (see section 3). 
 ments are indeed ˆ 0î   but the amount is lower than in the first-best case (Hart 
2003).8 
According to the first-best solution analysis of the previous paragraph, the derived 
recommendation for action for public authorities is evident: If the characteristics of 
the asset underlying  the economic exchange (here: the infrastructure) can be well 
specified and the quality of the service in the operational phase cannot, unbundling 
seems to be the better option as the PPP case would lead to an overinvestment in 
unproductive investments e , which has particularly negative consequences for the 
operational phase in the case that the service provided in the operational phase can-
not be specified well or monitored through performance measures. Hence, the ra-
tionale for the PPP case is the opposite, that is, a PPP seems to be the better alter-
native when the service provided in the operational phase can be specified well but 
there are concerns regarding the specification of the characteristics of the underlying 
asset (Hart 2003). 
In the following, it will be assessed how the contractor will behave, assuming he has 
preferences for distributional fairness. The analysis of the contractor’s behavior given 
preferences for distributional fairness requires a case-by-case study since both sce-
narios, advantageous or disadvantageous inequality, cannot apply at the same time 
when the contractor makes his decision on investment levels. To determine whether 
the psychological effect from an advantageous or disadvantageous inequality influ-
ences the contractor’s utility, the net payoffs to the contractor (
PPPC
V  or 
UNBC
V ) and to 
the public authority (
PPPPA
V  and 
UNBPA
V ) have to be compared in the respective cases. 
Accordingly, the influence of the fixed payment to the contractor 0P  is of high im-
portance. Given that the other fixed components (i.e. 0C  and 0B ) are exogenously 
given and not variable, the following analysis will show that 0P  is the main influence 
on the involved parties’ payoffs. Hence, the payment 0P  for the contractor’s services 
determines which psychological influence applies when deciding on his investment 
level, and therefore determines the shape of the contractor’s utility function.  
                                                 
8
 In the PPP case without preferences for distributional fairness, the second-best solution for the mod-
el presented here is the investment combination 
maxˆ [0; ]î Max i  and maxˆ [0; ]ê Max e  assuming 
that the conditions 1  , and 1c   apply. Hence, the investment amount of productive investments 
in the PPP case corresponds to the first-best solution which is different from the Hart (2003) model 
where 
* ˆ 0i î  . This is due to the fact that as a consequence of linear utility functions, only corner 
solutions are obtained. 
 Furthermore, fundamental to the hypotheses and following analysis in the respective 
cases is that the productivity parameters are in compliance with the conditions 
1   , 1c o  , 1  , and 1c  . These conditions are derived from the standard 
model of Hart (2003) (see also section 3). Hence, implicitly assuming that these con-
ditions hold in the analysis assures that the results of the model including prefer-
ences for distributional fairness are comparable to the standard model’s results.  
The analysis in the next section will show that the variation in parameters can have a 
significant influence on the contractor’s investment incentives as well. However, a 
comparison of these results with the Hart (2003) model’s results would not be appro-
priate as in this case, the optima of the Hart (2003) model would change as well. 
 
4.1. The unbundling case 
4.1.1. Case U1 – The public authority’s net payoffs are higher than the contrac-
tor’s in an unbundling setting 
Assuming that the public authority’s net payoffs are higher than the contractor’s net 
payoffs, i.e. 
UNB UNBPA C
V V , the case of disadvantageous inequality (“envy”) is relevant 
to the contractor when deciding on his investment in 0t   so that the third term of 
equation (7) is equal to zero. Hence, the contractor’s utility function is: 
, 1 *{ }UNB SP UNB UNB UNBC U C PA CU V V V       (11) 
 
By substituting 
UNBC
V  with equation (4) and 
UNBPA
V  with (6), the contractor’s utility func-
tion arrives at the following form: 
      
, 1 0 0 0 0 0*{ * * * * }UNB SPC UU P i e B i o e C i c e P P i e                         (12) 
 
where 
UNB UNBPA C
V V , i.e. 0 0 0 0* * * *B i o e C i c e P P i e          , which is equiva-
lent to 0 0 0* * * * 2B i o e C i c e i e P         .  
Hence, the psychological effect of disadvantageous inequality is relevant if the differ-
ence of the gross benefit to society B  plus the invested amount of productive and 
unproductive investments minus the costs of operating the infrastructure C  is higher 
than twice the fixed payment to the contractor 0P . 
In order to analyze the overall effect of preferences for distributional fairness on the 
contractor’s utility and his investment incentives, a partial analysis of the effects of 
 the respective investments on the contractor’s utility is useful. Therefore, equation 
(12) is differentiated with respect to i  and e : 
, 1
, 1
1 *{ 1}
1 *{ 1}
UNB SP
UNB SP
C U
C U
U
i
U
i
  
  



   


     

             (13) 
and 
, 1
, 1
1 *{ 1}
1 *{ 1}
UNB SP
UNB SP
C U
C U
U
c o
e
U
o c
e





    


     

             (7.14.) 
 
Hypothesis U1: 
In the unbundling case, the results of the Hart (2003) model are basically duplicated, 
i.e., the optimal combination of investments is ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê   when effects from 
disadvantageous distributional inequality apply. However, there can also apply a 
scenario (of productivity parameters) in which the optimal combination of investments 
includes unproductive investments, i.e. ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  . 
 
Argument U1: 
From the results of the standard model as well as from equations (4) and (11), we 
see that any productive or unproductive investment will reduce the contractor’s net 
payoffs. This implies that from the perspective of his own net payoffs, the contractor 
has no incentive to make either productive or unproductive investments. 
Consequently, the only way for the contractor to have an incentive to invest in the 
unbundling case with a sense of envy initially applying is if there is a combination of 
investments whereby the increase in the utility through the psychological effect co-
vers all losses from net payoffs. In order to realize this, there must be a combination 
of productivity parameters in which this effect is induced. 
From equation (12) as well as from the partial analysis in equation (13) on the effects 
of an investment in i  on the distributional inequality, we know that there is no combi-
nation of productivity parameters in which the contractor has an incentive to invest in 
i  from a partial perspective. Any productive investment i  will increase the distribu-
tional inequality and therefore intensify the negative psychological influence on the 
 contractor’s utility. Thus, the psychological effect from an investment in i  will always 
be negative. 
In contrast, we see from the equations (12) and the partial analysis in equation (14) 
that there exists a combination of productivity parameters where an investment in e  
will reduce the distributional inequality among the involved parties and induce a posi-
tive psychological effect. If this positive psychological effect on the contractor’s utility 
is higher than the negative effect of an investment in e  that arises due to the reduc-
tion of the contractor’s net payoffs, then the contractor will invest a positive amount in 
unproductive investments e  so that the combination of optimal investments is 
( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  .  
Technically speaking, unproductive investments serve in this case as a regulative 
measure in order to reduce the disadvantageous distributional inequality from the 
perspective of the contractor between him and the public authority. Consequently, 
these investment incentives are only relevant as long as the psychological effect from 
a sense of envy applies, i.e., as long as 
UNB UNBPA C
V V . Furthermore, we see from 
equations (12) and (14) that unproductive investments e  can only serve as a regula-
tive measure when the negative effect from an investment in e  on the society’s gross 
benefit B , which is determined by the productivity parameter o , is sufficiently high. 
Accordingly, the parameter o  must fulfill the condition 
1
(1 )o c

   , which is derived 
from equation (14). This condition is compatible with the parameter assumptions of 
the Hart (2003) model (see second to last paragraph in section 4) so that the optimal 
investment combination ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  is a realizable solution in which differences 
from the Hart (2003) model only stem from including preferences for distributional 
fairness in the analysis. 
For all other parameter scenarios, the combination of optimal investments in the un-
bundling case when a sense of envy applies is ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  , i.e., the envious 
contractor reproduces the behavior of a contractor where social preferences do not 
apply.■ 
 
 4.1.2. Case U2 – The public authority’s net payoffs are lower than the contrac-
tor’s in an unbundling setting 
Assuming that the public authority’s net payoffs are lower than the contractor’s net 
payoffs (i.e. 
UNB UNBC PA
V V ), the case of advantageous inequality (“sense of guilt”) is 
relevant to the contractor at the point of decision so that the second term of equation 
(7) is equal to zero. Now, the contractor’s utility function is: 
, 2 *{ }UNB SP UNB UNB UNBC U C C PAU V V V       (15) 
 
Here again, 
UNBC
V  can be substituted with equation (4) and 
UNBPA
V  with (6) so that the 
contractor’s utility function is: 
      
, 2 0 0 0 0 0*{ * * * * }UNB SPC UU P i e P i e B i o e C i c e P                   (16) 
 
where 
UNB UNBC PA
V V , i.e. 0 0 0 0* * * *P i e B i o e C i c e P          , which is equiva-
lent to 0 0 0* * * * 2B i o e C i c e i e P         . 
 
In order to assess the investment incentives of the contractor in case U2, equation 
(16) is differentiated with respect to i  and e : 
, 2
, 2
1 *{ 1 }
1 *{1 }
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C U
C U
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    (17) 
and 
, 2
, 2
1 *{ 1 }
1 *{ 1}
UNB SP
UNB SP
C U
C U
U
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e
U
c o
e





    


     

    (18) 
 
Hypothesis U2: 
In the unbundling case, when effects from advantageous distributional inequality ap-
ply and the productivity parameters are consistent with the Hart (2003) model, then 
 only one equilibrium can exist where the contractor invests in productive investment 
and omits making unproductive investments, i.e., ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  .
9
  
Hence, the result when psychological effects from an advantageous distributional 
inequality apply is significantly different from the Hart (2003) model, i.e., ( 0; 0)î ê  , 
and can even reach the first best, i.e., ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  , with 
max* [0; ]Uspî i Max i   if 
the differences in net payoffs are high enough that the contractor has to invest the 
maximal possible amount of productive investments in order to reduce the advanta-
geous distributional inequality. 
 
Argument U2: 
As the net payoffs do not change when the nature of the psychological effect chang-
es, the contractor’s net payoffs remain the same and will still decrease for every in-
vestment in i  and e . Hence, again the psychological effect determines whether the 
contractor has an incentive to invest. 
Accordingly, it can be seen from equations (16) and (17) that the negative psycholog-
ical effect will be reduced in any case through productive investments i  as the condi-
tion *{1 } 0      holds for any combination of parameters , 0   . Technically 
speaking, the second term in equation (17) implies that productive investments will 
reduce the advantageous inequality in payoffs in any case. Now, in order to induce 
incentives to invest, the beneficial effect on the contractor’s utility from reducing the 
distributional inequality must cover the losses in net payoffs from an investment in i  , 
i.e., *{1 } 1      must hold. As elaborated earlier (e.g., second to last paragraph 
in section 4), it is assumed that the conditions 1    and 1   hold in order to pro-
vide a parameter set that is comparable to the Hart (2003) model. Thus, we know 
that if 0.5  , then the condition *{1 } 1      will be met. In this regard, we know 
from the seminal essay of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) on the effects of distributional 
fairness within an economic exchange that “ 0.5   implies that player i is just indif-
                                                 
9 Theoretically, various combinations of optimal investments can exist, depending on the productivity 
parameters. Here, possible optima are the combinations ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  , ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  , 
and in a special case a scenario where any combination ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  that implies a psycholog-
ical effect equal to zero is optimal. However, the necessary combination of parameters leading to 
these investments is incompatible with the parameter values that underlie the Hart (2003) model and 
therefore remain disregarded. 
 ferent between keeping one dollar to himself and giving this dollar to player j” (Fehr 
and Schmidt 1999: 824). Consequently, it can be derived that in order to simulate a 
fair-minded contractor, a parameter value of 0.5   has to be assumed so that it is 
consequential that a fair-minded contractor who “suffers” from advantageous inequal-
ity will make productive investments 0Uspî   as long as his sense of guilt is effective, 
i.e., as long as 
UNB UNBC PA
V V . 
The analysis of unproductive investments is analogous. As the effect from an invest-
ment in e  on the contractor’s net payoffs is negative, the psychological effect must 
cover these losses. Thus, from equation (18) we see that 
1
{ 1}c o

    must hold. In 
order to assure the similarity with the Hart (2003) model’s parameters, also the condi-
tions 1c o   and 1c   must be met. From the examination of these conditions, it can 
be seen that for 0.5   there can exist a parameter c  that meets the necessary 
condition 
1
{ 1}c o

    without violating the other conditions 1c o   and 1c  . Thus, 
from a partial perspective, the contractor would theoretically have an incentive to 
make unproductive investments, i.e., 0Uspê   as long as 
UNB UNBC PA
V V . 
For the assessment of the overall investment incentives, both partial effects have to 
be compared. Possible optima can theoretically include the combinations
( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  , ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  , ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  , and in a special case a scenar-
io in which both investment types have the same effect on the contractor’s utility, and 
therefore any combination of ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê   that completely eliminates the overall 
psychological effect is optimal. 
Among these theoretically possible combinations ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê   is the only realiz-
able optimum given the restrictions on the parameters that arise from the analogy to 
the Hart (2003) model. The rationale is as follows: 
a) For the combination ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê   to be the optimal solution, the effect on 
the contractor’s utility from reducing the negative psychological influence 
through productive investments i  must be in a first step higher than the reduc-
tion of the contractor’s net payoffs. This is the case as it was shown in the 
course of the partial analysis above for any combination of parameters that is 
consistent with the Hart (2003) model. 
 In addition the effect from reducing the psychological influence through pro-
ductive investments in i  must be higher than the effect of unproductive in-
vestments on the psychological influence, i.e. *{ 1} *{1 }c o        . This 
condition is equivalent to c o     . As the right side is 1    as in the 
Hart (2003) model and the left side of the inequation is 1c o   , the neces-
sary condition *{ 1} *{1 }c o         is met for any combination of pa-
rameters. Hence, there can exist an optimal investment combination with 
( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  . Here, the exact amount of Uspî  depends on the difference in 
payoffs between both agents. If the difference, which depends at the point of 
decision on the payment to the contractor 
0P , is high enough, it can even re-
sult in an optimal investment combination ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê   where the contrac-
tor will invest max* [0; ]Uspî i Max i  . Hence, the first-best will be realized. 
b) The combination ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê   is not feasible as an optimal solution as the 
contractor always has incentives to invest 0Uspî  in any case (see above).  
c) For the combination ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê   to be the optimal solution, the effect on 
the contractor’s utility from reducing the negative psychological influence 
through unproductive investments must be higher than the effect of productive 
investments on the psychological influence. Hence, the parameters must meet 
the condition *{ 1} *{1 }c o        , which is equivalent to c o     .  
As was shown in bullet point a) of this section, this condition cannot hold as 
1    and 1c o   must be met in order to be compliant with the Hart 
(2003) model. Thus, ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  is not realizable. 
d) The third theoretically possible combination is a special case where both psy-
chological influences have exactly the same effect on the contractor’s utility so 
that any combination of ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê   that eliminates the psychological ef-
fect is optimal. Accordingly, the necessary parameter combination for this sce-
nario to be realized is *{ 1} *{1 }c o        . Here again, we know that 
this result cannot hold as 1    and 1c o   must be met.  
 
To summarize, the optimal investment ( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  is the only realizable combi-
nation. The exact amount of 0Uspî   can be regulated through payment 0P  to the con-
 tractor. The higher the advantageous inequality in payoffs, the more a fair-minded 
contractor will invest in order to reduce the discrepancy between him and the public 
authority. Thus, having full information on the productivity parameters and the aver-
sion parameter  , the public authority can choose the payment 0P  so that the first-
best result max( * [0; ]; * 0)Usp Uspî i Max i ê e     will be reached.■ 
 
4.2. The PPP case 
4.2.1. Case P1 – The public authority’s net payoffs are higher than the contrac-
tor’s in a PPP setting 
As in case U1 (section 4.1.1.), it is assumed that the public authority’s net payoffs are 
higher than the contractor’s net payoffs, i.e. 
PPP PPPPA C
V V . As a consequence, the 
case of disadvantageous inequality (“envy” case) is relevant to the contractor at the 
point of decision so that the third term of equation (10) is equal to zero. Hence, the 
contractor’s utility function is: 
, 1 *{ }PPP SP PPP PPP PPPC P C PA CU V V V     
 
By substituting 
PPPC
V  with equation (8) and 
PPPPA
V  with equation (9), the contractor’s 
utility function is: 
, 1 0 0 0 0 0 0* * *{ * * * * }PPP SPC PU P C i c e i e B i o e P P C i c e i e                   
            (19) 
 
The relation between the payoffs of the involved agents is 
PPP PPPC PA
V V , i.e. 
0 0 0 0* * * *P C i c e i e B i o e P          . 
 
In order to have an impression on the effect of investments on the contractor’s utility 
PPP SPC
U

 from a partial analysis perspective, equation (19) is differentiated with respect 
to i  and e :  
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and 
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.   (21) 
 
Hypothesis P1: 
In the PPP case, when psychological effects from disadvantageous inequality apply, 
several optimal investment combinations can result, depending on the productivity 
parameters, , ,o   and c . Assuming that the parameters are consistent with the Hart 
(2003) model, the possible optima include the combinations ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   
(with the first-best combination also being possible), ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê  , and 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê  . 
 
Argument P1: 
From the results of the standard model as well as from equation (19), we know that 
any productive or unproductive investment will increase the contractor’s net payoffs 
as * 0i i    and * 0c e e  , i.e., 1   and 1c  . This implies that from the perspec-
tive of his own net payoffs, the contractor has an incentive to make the highest pos-
sible amount of productive and unproductive investments. Thus, it has to be exam-
ined in which way the psychological effect influences this incentive scheme. 
From the partial perspective on productive investments i  in equation (20), it can be 
seen that the psychological effect is positive when 1   . Here, any investment in 
i  will reduce the distributional inequality among the involved parties and therefore 
raise the contractor’s utility so that the contractor has an incentive to make productive 
investments i  as long as 
PPP PPPPA C
V V . In addition, the contractor can also have in-
 centives to make productive investments i  despite a negative psychological influ-
ence if the increase in net payoffs is higher than the negative psychological effect, 
i.e., if 1 *{ 1} 0        .  
The partial analysis of unproductive investments is analogous. Here, it can be seen 
from equation (21) that the psychological effect is positive when 1 0c o   . As the 
parameters are such that they correspond to the standard model (e.g., 1c  , 1c o 
), this condition will always be met as 1c   and does not violate the Hart (2003) mod-
el’s conditions as long as 1c o   so that the contractor will always have an incentive 
to make unproductive investments e  in the PPP case as long as 
PPP PPPPA C
V V  from a 
partial perspective. 
For the analysis of overall investment incentives and the identification of optimal in-
vestment combinations, the comparison of the overall effects (net payoffs and psy-
chological effect) is decisive. As the partial analysis revealed from a partial perspec-
tive that 0PPPspê   when 1c   and additionally that the contractor always has an in-
centive to invest in both types of investments from the perspective of his net payoffs, 
an optimal combination with ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   is not plausible from an overall per-
spective. Thus, it has to be analyzed whether the combinations ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê  , 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê  , and ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   are realizable. 
a) Keeping in mind that the contractor has an incentive to make unproductive in-
vestments from a partial perspective, the first combination 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   is only feasible if the parameters are such that the partial 
effect from a productive investment is higher than the partial effect of an un-
productive investment, i.e., if 1 *{ 1} 1 *{ 1}c c o             , which is 
equivalent to the condition *{ }1
c o

 

  
 . This condition is compatible with 
the parameter set of the Hart (2003) model as the conditions from the stand-
ard model for   to hold are 1   and 1   , so that the investment combi-
nation ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê  is realizable. In addition, the contractor will always 
invest max* [0; ]PPPspî i Max i  , which implies that if for the parameter   the 
condition *{ }1
c o

 

  
  holds, then the first-best solution will be achieved. 
A combined investment in both types is in this case not relevant, as both psy-
 chological effects operate in the same direction but the positive effect from an 
investment in productive investments is higher. Hence, a combined investment 
in productive and unproductive investments would not be efficient assuming 
that the parameters are such that the condition *{ }1
c o

 

  
  is fulfilled. 
b) Underlying to the combinations ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   and ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   
is that the contractor has incentives to make unproductive investments rather 
than productive investments, i.e., 1 *{ 1} 1 *{ 1}c c o             . In 
contrast to the previous case, the psychological effect from an investment in i  
can be positive or negative. Thus, an additional distinction is necessary, which 
will explain why two different optimal combinations can result.  
Assuming that the psychological effect from an investment in i  is positive, i.e., 
*{ 1} 0     , then the rationale is similar to the previous case. Here, the 
condition 1 *{ 1} 1 *{ 1}c c o              must be met, which is equiva-
lent to the condition *{ }
1
c o

 

   

. This condition is compatible with 
the parameter set of the Hart (2003) model as the conditions from the stand-
ard model for c  to hold are 1c   and 1c o   so that the investment combina-
tion ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê  with 
max[0; ]PPPspê Max e  is also one of the realizable 
optimal investment combinations implying a “worst-case” investment combina-
tion as the maximum amount of unproductive investments is realized while 
productive investments are omitted. 
If the psychological effect of a productive investment i  is negative, i.e., 
*{ 1} 0     , then the analysis has to focus on the differences in payoffs 
and the maximum amount of investments that are possible, i.e. [0; ]e  and [0; ]i . 
The necessary condition remains the same, i.e., *{ }
1
c o

 

   

 so that 
the contractor will make unproductive investments e  as long as 
PPP PPPPA C
V V . If 
the disadvantageous difference in payoffs between the contractor and the 
public authority is that high enough that the contractor can invest 
max[0; ]PPPspê Max e  then the optimal combination of investments will be 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê  . If the contractor cannot invest 
max[0; ]PPPspê Max e , then 
the contractor will make productive investments i  in order to increase the dif-
 ferences in payoffs. Through this, the contractor can in turn make more un-
productive investments. Thus, the optimal combination of investments will be 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê  where in an extreme case the investment levels 
max[0; ]PPPspî Max i  and 
max[0; ]PPPspê Max e  will be achieved, which is identical 
to the result of the Hart (2003) model with linear utility functions.10■ 
 
4.2.2. Case P2 – The public authority’s net payoffs are lower than the contrac-
tor’s in a PPP setting 
The final case of the analysis presented here is the PPP case where the public au-
thority’s net payoffs are lower than the contractor’s net payoffs, i.e. 
UNB UNBC PA
V V . Ac-
cordingly, the psychological effect of advantageous inequality (“sense of guilt”) is rel-
evant to the contractor at the point of decision so that the second term of equation 
(10) is equal to zero. Hence, the contractor’s utility function is: 
, 2 *{ }PPP SP PPP PPP PPPC P C C PAU V V V     
 
Again, 
PPPC
V  and 
PPPPA
V  can be substituted with equations (8) and (9). Hence, the fol-
lowing form for the contractor’s utility function results: 
, 2 0 0 0 0 0 0* * *{ * * * * }PPP SPC PU P C i c e i e P C i c e i e B i o e P                   
            (22) 
 
with 
PPP PPPC PA
V V , i.e. 0 0 0 0* * * *P C i c e i e B i o e P          , which is equiva-
lent to 0 0 02 * * * *P B i o e C i c e i e         . 
 
For the partial analysis required to analyze the total effects, equation (22) is differen-
tiated with respect to i  and e , leading to:  
 
                                                 
10
 The numerical example in section 5 will include the case where ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   in order to 
illustrate this particular scenario. 
  
, 2
, 2
, 2
1 *{ 1 }
1 *{1 }
(1 )* 1 *{1 }
PPP SP
PPP SP
PPP SP
C P
C P
C P
U
i
U
i
U
i
   
   
   




    


     


     

   (23) 
 
and 
 
 
, 2
, 2
, 2
1 *{ 1 }
1 *{1 }
(1 )* 1 *{1 }
PPP SP
PPP SP
PPP SP
C P
C P
C P
U
c c o
e
U
c c o
e
U
c o
e


 




    


     


     

   (24) 
 
 
Hypothesis P2: 
In the PPP case when psychological effects from disadvantageous inequality apply, 
several optimal investment combinations can result, depending on the productivity 
parameters, , ,o   and c . Assuming that the parameters are such that they repro-
duce the results of the Hart (2003) model, the possible optima include the combina-
tions ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   (with the first-best combination also being possible) and 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê  . 
 
Argument P2: 
As in the case P1, the parameters are consistent with Hart’s (2003) model so that the 
contractor’s net payoffs increase with every productive and unproductive investment 
since 1   and 1c  . Thus, from the perspective of his own net payoffs, the contrac-
tor has again an incentive to make the highest possible amount of productive and 
unproductive investments and it has to be analyzed how the psychological effect in-
fluences this incentive scheme. 
From a partial perspective, the psychological effect of an investment in e  will be 
negative in any case as *{1 } 0c o     for 1c  . In addition, it can be also seen that 
the increase in the net payoffs will not be high enough to cover the losses from the 
 negative psychological effect in any case, i.e. 1 *{1 } 0c c o      for any parame-
ter combination that respects the conditions 1c   and 1c o  . Thus, the contractor 
does not have an incentive to make unproductive investments from a partial perspec-
tive. 
Regarding productive investments, the partial analysis needs further distinctions as 
the psychological effect from a productive investment can be either positive if 
*{1 } 0      or negative if *{1 } 0     . When including the effects of a pro-
ductive investment on the net payoffs into the partial analysis, it can be seen that the 
contractor will always have an incentive to make productive investments i  since 
1 *{1 } 0         (which is equivalent to 1 *{ 1 }       ) holds for any 
combination of parameters with 1  , 0  , and 0 1  . 
As the partial analysis revealed that the contractor will not have an incentive to make 
unproductive investments in any case and will always have an incentive to make 
productive investments when the parameters are consistent with the parameters of 
the Hart (2003) model, the optimal investment combinations ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê  and 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   are not possible. ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   cannot be realized as the 
partial analysis revealed that the contractor always has an incentive to invest 
0PPPspî  , and ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   cannot be realized as the necessary condition 
would be that the contractor has higher incentives to make unproductive investments 
than productive investments from a partial perspective, which is not possible as the 
partial incentive is 0PPPspê  . Thus, it has to be analyzed whether and under which 
conditions the combinations ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   and ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   are real-
izable. 
a) As it is known from the partial analysis that the contractor has an incentive to 
make productive investments i  for any combination of parameters consistent 
with the Hart (2003) model, the optimal combination of investments 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   can be realized through two scenarios.  
In the first scenario, the psychological influence for both types of investments 
is effective in the same direction. Hence, if the psychological effect from an in-
vestment in i  is negative, i.e. *{1 } 0     , and if the psychological effect 
from an investment in e  is also negative, i.e., *{1 } 0c o    , which is given 
 for any combination of parameters with 1c  , then the resulting optimal in-
vestment combination is ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   in any case. 
In the second scenario, the psychological influence of an investment in i  is 
positive, and consequently is effective in the opposite direction of the psycho-
logical influence of an investment in e . Hence, the analysis has to focus on 
the differences in payoffs and the maximum amount of investments that are 
possible, i.e. [0; ]e  and [0; ]i . Here, the contractor will make productive invest-
ments i  as long as 
PPP PPPPA C
V V . If the advantageous difference in payoffs in 
favor of the contractor is high enough that the contractor will invest 
max[0; ]PPPspî Max i , then the optimal combination of investments 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   with 
max[0; ]PPPspî Max i , i.e. the first-best, will be 
achieved.  
b) The optimal investment combination ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   is closely tied to the 
just described scenario. Here, again, both psychological influences are effec-
tive in opposite directions. However, in this case, the contractor cannot invest 
max[0; ]PPPspî Max i  as the difference in payoffs is not high enough. Hence, the 
contractor will make unproductive investments e  in order to increase the dif-
ferences in payoffs since he can in turn make more productive investments 
through this, so that the optimal combination of productive and unproductive 
investments will be ( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê  . As in case P1 (see section 4.2.1.), a 
combination with max[0; ]PPPspî Max i  and 
max[0; ]PPPspê Max e  can be 
achieved, which is identical to the result of the Hart (2003) model assuming 
linear utility functions.■ 
 
With the theoretical analysis of the contractor’s investment incentives completed, the 
following tables summarize the results and compare the findings of the model pre-
sented in this essay with the results of the standard model of Hart (2003), and then 
the next section illustrates the theoretical findings with a numerical example. Again, it 
has to be emphasized that the results derived in the actual model were developed 
assuming that the parameters are consistent with the Hart (2003) model.   
 
 
  Hart (2003) model Yildiz (2015) model 
 (with linear functions) 
UNB UNBC PA
V V  
UNB UNBC PA
V V  
Unbundling 
 
case 
 
There exists only one 
optimal investment 
combination: 
 
( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There exist several optimal combinations depending 
on the productivity parameters: 
 
a) 
( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê   if 
1
(1 )o c

     
 
b) 
( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê   if 
1
(1 )o c

     
 
 
There exists only one optimal investment combination: 
 
( 0; 0)Usp Uspî ê  ; with 
max* [0; ]Uspî i Max i 
possible if 0P  high enough. 
 
This optimum is resulting, irrespective of the productivi-
ty parameters as long as the parameters are con-
sistent with the Hart (2003) model. 
 
 
 
Tab.1: Summary of the model’s results in the unbundling case and comparison with the Hart (2003) model. 
(Author’s design). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  Hart (2003) model Yildiz (2015) model 
 (with linear functions) 
UNB UNBC PA
V V  
UNB UNBC PA
V V  
PPP case 
 
There exists only one optimal investment 
combination: 
 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   
 
Note:  
If linear functions as in the Yildiz (2015) 
model are applied, then the optimal com-
bination of investments is 
max max( [0; ]; [0; ])PPPsp PPPspî Max i ê Max e  . 
The condition to realize this optimum is 
1   and 1c  .  
 
Otherwise, other optimal combinations in the 
PPP case of Hart (2003) model) can re-
sult. 
 
 
There exist several optimal combinations de-
pending on the productivity parameters: 
 
a) 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   if *{ }
1
c o

 

  

 
max* [0; ]PPPspî i Max i   possible 
 
b.1.) 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   if *{ }
1
c o

 

   

 
and *{ 1} 0     ; with 
max[0; ]PPPspe Max e possible 
 
b.2.) 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   if *{ }
1
c o

 

   

 
and *{ 1} 0     ; and the contractor 
can invest max[0; ]PPPspê Max e  
 
c) 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   if 
*{ }
1
c o

 

   

 and 
*{ 1} 0     ; and contractor  has to 
invest  0PPPspî  in order to move toward 
max[0; ]PPPspê Max e  
 
 
There exist several optimal combinations de-
pending on the productivity parameters: 
 
a.1.) 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   if *{1 } 0      
with 
max* [0; ]PPPspî i Max i  possible 
 
a.2.)  
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   if *{1 } 0      
and the contractor can invest 
max* [0; ]PPPspî i Max i   
 
b) 
( 0; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê   if *{1 } 0      
and contractor has to invest  0PPPspê  in 
order to move toward max[0; ]PPPspî Max i  
Tab.2: Summary of the model’s results in the PPP case and comparison with the Hart (2003) model. 
(Author’s design). 
 5. Simulation of the contractor’s behavior  
In the following, a numerical example whose results are graphically visualized with 
the software Wolfram Mathematica displays the theoretical insights presented in the 
previous sections 4.1. and 4.2. 
The numerical example starts with assigning values to the variables. The productivity 
parameters were chosen so that they replicate the results of the Hart (2003) model 
with linear functions. The values for the aversion parameters   and   were derived 
according to the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model. Here, as also addressed in section 
4.1.2., Fehr and Schmidt (1999) elaborated on the range of the aversion parameters 
and discussed interpretations of different values. Thus, 0.5   implies an economic 
agent who disposes of a sense of guilt and suffers from advantageous distributional 
inequality. Regarding  , it has to be stated that there is no upper bound on the 
sense of envy. In fact, assumptions about the distribution of preferences derived from 
the analysis of experimental results on the ultimatum game reveal that more than 40 
per cent of the experiments’ participants showed a behavior that corresponds to an 
  of higher than 1   (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). According to this, the values of the 
variables are as follows: 
0 100B  ; 0 20C  ; 0 50P  ; ( )o e e ; ( ) 1.5*c e e ; ( ) 1.5*i i  ; ( )i i  ; 1.5  ; 0.6   
 
When inserting these values into the net benefit function of the economic exchange 
(see equation 3), the following function results: 
.
.
( , ) 100 20 1.5* * 1.5*
( , ) 80 1.5* 0.5*
Soc
Soc
U e i i e i e i e
U e i i e
       
   
 
 
Hence, it is clear that this function will be optimized when max* [0; ]i Max i  and * 0e  , 
which can be also seen in Figure 2 (Fig. 2). 
  
Fig. 2: 3D plot of the society’s net utility function.  
(Author’s design, made with Wolfram Mathematica). 
 
Figure 2 (Fig. 2) shows in a 3D plot the society’s utility function (equation (3)) with the 
above defined values for the model’s variables and for the interval [0;20]i  and 
[0;20]e . As predicted, the society’s net utility is maximized (i.e., graphically the 
highest point of the plot) where * 20i   (i.e., max* [0; ]i Max i ) and * 0e  . 
With this first-best solution for the investment in mind, the following section will ana-
lyze the contractor’s investment incentives given preferences for distributional fair-
ness in the respective cases, starting with the unbundling case. 
 
5.1. The unbundling case 
Applying the numerical example to equations (4) and (6), we obtain the following re-
sults for the involved parties’ net payoffs: 
50
UNBC
V i e        (25) 
30 2.5* 0.5*
UNBPA
V i e       (26) 
 
The contractor’s objective is to maximize his utility, which is in the standard model 
equal to his payoffs 
UNBC
V . Hence, it is consequential that a utility maximizing contrac-
tor will not invest neither in i  nor in e , i.e., 0î  and 0ê  , as we can see from equa-
tion (25) that any further investment will reduce the contractor’s payoffs. This result 
can also be shown graphically (Fig.3). Here, the highest point of the plane is at the 
combination of 0î  and 0ê  . 
 
  
Fig. 3: 3D plot of the contractor’s utility in the unbundling case in the standard model.  
(Author’s design, made with Wolfram Mathematica). 
 
Assuming that the contractor has preferences for distributional equality, his invest-
ment incentives change significantly. 
When applying the numerical example to equation (7), the contractor’s utility function 
with preferences for distributional equality is as follows: 
50 1.5* { 20 3.5* 1.5* ,0} 0.6* {20 3.5* 1.5* ,0}
UNB SPC
U i e max i e max i e

           
              (27) 
 
From the terms in the brackets, it can be seen that for the numerical example above, 
the psychological effect from advantageous inequality applies at the point of decision 
as the term in the brackets of the second term (i.e., 20 3.5* 1.5*i e   ), representing 
the psychological effect of envy, is below zero for the values of 0i   and 0e  . In 
other words, the term in the brackets of the second term, i.e. 
UNB UNBPA C
V V , is below 
zero for the values of 0i   and 0e  . Hence, the condition 
UNB UNBPA C
V V  applies, 
meaning that the contractor suffers from the psychological effect of advantageous 
inequality as long as 
UNB UNBPA C
V V  holds. Figure 4 (Fig.4) will show the depiction of 
the contractor’s utility for the above defined numerical example from two different an-
gles. 
  
Fig.4: 3D plot of the contractor’s utility in the unbundling case when a sense of guilt applies.  
(Author’s design, made with Wolfram Mathematica). 
 
From Fig.4, we see that, compared to the standard model, the applying sense of guilt 
induces investment incentives to the contractor. From equation (27), we see that any 
investment in i  will reduce advantageous inequality in payoffs, which raises the con-
tractor’s utility 
UNB SPC
U

. As the positive effect on the contractor’s utility from a reduction 
of advantageous inequality is higher than the loss of utility from the reduction in net 
payoffs, the contractor has incentives to make productive investments i  as long as 
the psychological effect from a sense of guilt applies. In addition, we also see that 
any investment in e  will likewise reduce advantageous inequality in payoffs, which 
raises the contractor’s utility as long as the sense of guilt is relevant. However, re-
garding unproductive investments e , the positive effect on the contractor’s utility from 
a reduction in advantageous inequality is lower than the loss of utility from the reduc-
tion in net payoffs. Hence, any investment in e  lowers in total the contractor’s utility 
UNB SPC
U

.  
From this assessment, we know that the optimal combination of investments to max-
imize the contractor’s utility can only be at the point where the maximal amount of 
 productive investments i  is made before the vertex of the plane (i.e., the contractor’s 
utility 
UNB SPC
U

), i.e., 
UNB UNBC PA
V V , is reached. Hence, the optimal combination is 
( 5.71; 0)Usp Uspî ê  , which implies more productive investments than in the optimum 
of the standard model ( 0; 0)î ê  . At the given combination of investment, we reach 
the vertex of the plane in Fig.4. This vertex represents the combination of invest-
ments i  and e  where the applying psychological effect is zero and afterwards 
changes from a sense of guilt to a sense of envy. When the applying effect changes, 
the negative psychological effect on the contractor’s utility is intensified for any in-
vestment so that his utility will decrease. To summarize, the applying psychological 
effect of advantageous distributional inequality changed the contractor’s incentives 
significantly as the optimal combination of investments now includes productive in-
vestments.11 
As discussed in the theoretical assessment, a variation of the fixed payment 0P  to the 
contractor influences the optimal combination of investments as the payment 0P  de-
termines how long a psychological effect persists. Figure 5 (Fig.5) will show the de-
velopment of the contractor’s utility when the payment 0P  is varied. 
 
                                                 
11
 The analysis on the planes (and therefore on the contractor’s utility) run is only relevant for the 
above given numerical example. As elaborated in section 4.1, other parameter combinations can lead 
to scenarios where other investment combinations are optimal for the contractor. 
  
Fig.5: 3D plot of the evolution of the contractor’s utility in the unbundling case when 
0P  is varied.  
(Author’s design, made with Wolfram Mathematica). 
 
In the first (upper) illustration of Fig.5, the contractor’s utility is illustrated when the 
payment 0P  for his service is 0 30P  . Given this payment and all other parameters 
being the same as in the numerical example at the introduction of this subsection, his 
utility function changes to: 
30 1.5* {20 3.5* 1.5* ,0} 0.6* { 20 3.5* 1.5* ,0}
UNB SPC
U i e max i e max i e

           
Here, it can be seen that the psychological effect from disadvantageous distributional 
inequality applies and that any productive or unproductive investment will reduce the 
 contractor’s utility. Hence, the optimal combination of investments is 
( 0 ; 0)Usp Uspî ê  . 
In the second (central) illustration of Fig.5, the contractor’s utility is illustrated when 
the payment 0P  for his service is 0 50P  . This case has already been discussed and 
the result was that the optimal combination is ( 5.71; 0)Usp Uspî ê  . The light blue ar-
row shows how the optimal combination is shifted compared to the initial case (
0 30P  ) as the psychological effects from a sense of guilt now apply. This incentiviz-
es the contractor to make productive investments i  as long as the sense of guilt ap-
plies. 
In the third (lower) illustration of Fig.5, the run of the contractor’s utility is illustrated 
when the payment 0P  for his service is 0 70P  . Here, his utility function changes to: 
70 1.5* { 60 3.5* 1.5* ,0} 0.6* {60 3.5* 1.5* ,0}
UNB SPC
U i e max i e max i e

           
From the function term, it can be seen that the psychological effect from advanta-
geous distributional inequality applies as in the previous case where 0 50P  . Howev-
er, for 0 70P  , the distributional inequality is larger so that the contractor has a wider 
range to make productive and unproductive investments. As all other parameters of 
the numerical example are modified, the same rationale as for 0 50P   is applied. 
Hence, in the optimum, the contractor will not make unproductive investments and 
will invest as much as he can in productive investments i  as long as the sense of 
guilt is effective (i.e. as long as 
UNB UNBPA C
V V ). Accordingly, the optimal combination of 
investments is ( 17.14; 0)Usp Uspî ê  . The light blue arrow in the lower illustration 
shows again the shift from the original optimum (where 0 30P  ). 
 
5.2. The PPP case 
The basis for the upcoming analysis is again the involved parties’ payoffs. According-
ly, through applying the numerical example to equations (8) and (9), we obtain the 
following results for the respective net payoffs: 
 30 0.5* 0.5*
PPPC
V i e       (28) 
 50
PPPPA
V i e        (29) 
 
 Again, the contractor’s objective is to maximize his utility. Hence, in the standard 
model, the contractor’s utility is equal to his payoffs 
PPPC
V . From equation (29), we see 
that any investment in i  and e  will raise the contractor’s payoffs so that a utility max-
imizing contractor will choose max* [0; ]PPPî i Max i   and 
max[0; ]PPPê Max e , which im-
plies an overinvestment in unproductive investments e . Consequently, when plotting 
the contractor’s utility for the interval [0;50]i  and [0;50]e , the combination of op-
timal investments in the PPP case will be ( 50; 50)PPP PPPî ê  , as can be seen in fig-
ure 6 (Fig.6). 
 
 
Fig.6: 3D plot of the contractor’s utility in the PPP case in the standard model.  
(Author’s design, made with Wolfram Mathematica). 
 
In analogy to the unbundling case, the contractor’s investment incentives change 
significantly when he has preferences for a fair distribution of payoffs. Hence, apply-
ing the numerical example to equation (10) delivers the following utility function for 
the contractor: 
30 0.5* 0.5* 1.5*max{20 0.5* 1.5* ,0} 0.6*max{ 20 0.5* 1.5* ,0}
PPP SPC
U i e i e i e

         
            (30) 
 
 Accordingly, we see from the utility function that a sense of envy will affect the con-
tractor’s utility at the point of decision as the term in the first bracket of the utility func-
tion 
PPP SPC
U

, i.e., {20 0.5* 1.5* ,0}i e  , is positive for the starting values of the simula-
tion, i.e., 0i  and 0e  . The rationale underlying to this result is similar to the expla-
nations in section 4.2.2. Figure 7 (Fig.7) displays the contractor’s utility in the PPP 
case for the above defined numerical example when fairness preferences are effec-
tive. 
 
Fig.7: 3D plot of the contractor’s utility in the PPP case when a sense of envy applies.  
(Author’s design, made with Wolfram Mathematica). 
 
As can be seen in Fig.7, the optimal investment is ( 50; 30)PPPsp PPPspî ê  . This can 
be explained as any investment in e  will raise the contractor’s net payoffs as well as 
reduce the disadvantageous distributional inequality as the contractor now operates 
the infrastructure and profits from the cost reduction (as the relevant productivity pa-
rameter is 1c  ), whereas the public authority’s net payoffs are reduced (as 
* 0o e e    ). Hence, it is optimal for the contractor to invest as much as possible in 
unproductive investments. Without any investment in i , this amount would be 
13.3PPPspê  . 
The examination of the partial effects of an investment in i  reveals that a unit of pro-
ductive investment i  has a positive effect on the contractor’s net payoffs (as we also 
 know from the standard model), but from equation (30) we also see that an invest-
ment in i  increases the disadvantageous inequality and consequently intensifies the 
negative psychological effect. As this negative effect on the contractor’s utility is 
higher than the positive effect on the contractor’s utility stemming from the increase in 
net payoffs that arise from an investment in i , the contractor would not have an in-
centive to make productive investments if it was based on a partial decision without 
any consideration of unproductive investments. 
However, from an overall perspective including both types of investments simultane-
ously, the contractor has substantial incentives to make productive investments. The 
rationale is that any productive investment i  allows the contractor to make more un-
productive investments e . As the overall effect from an investment in unproductive 
investments e  on the contractor’s utility is higher than the effect of a productive in-
vestment, he chooses the combination where he can invest the most in unproductive 
investment e , i.e., ( 50; 30)PPPsp PPPspî ê  . Higher investments in unproductive in-
vestments in e  are suboptimal as here, effects from advantageous inequality would 
apply where investments in e  lower the contractor’s utility (see equation (30)). 
Similar to the numerical illustration of the unbundling case, a step-by-step variation of 
the fixed payment to the contractor 
0P  also leads to an adjustment of the optimum as 
can be seen in figure 8 (Fig.8). 
 
  
Fig.8: 3D plot of the evolution of the contractor’s utility in the PPP case when 
0P  is varied.  
(Author’s design, made with Wolfram Mathematica). 
 
In the first (upper) illustration of Fig.8, the contractor’s utility in the PPP case is illus-
trated when the payment 0P  for his service is 0 30P  . Given this payment and all 
other parameters being the same to the numerical example at the introduction of this 
subsection, his utility function changes to: 
10 0.5* 0.5* 1.5*max{60 0.5* 1.5* ,0} 0.6*max{ 60 0.5* 1.5* ,0}
PPP SPC
U i e i e i e

         
 
Here, it can be seen that the psychological effect from disadvantageous distributional 
inequality applies at the point of decision and that the contractor has an incentive to 
invest in unproductive investments e  from the net payoff and psychological perspec-
tive. When making only unproductive investments, the contractor could invest 
 ( 0; 40)PPPsp PPPspî ê  . However, through making productive investments in parallel, 
the contractor can “move” upwards on the vertex (where 
PPP PPPC PA
V V ) of the plane 
and reach the combination of investments that maximizes his utility. Hence, the opti-
mal investment combination when the payment to the contractor is 
0 30P   is 
( 30; 50)PPPsp PPPspî ê  . The light blue arrow in the upper illustration shows how the 
optimum is shifted compared to the standard model. 
The second (central) illustration of Fig.8 shows the already discussed case of the 
contractor’s utility when the payment 0P  for his service is 0 50P  . Here still, the sense 
of envy applies but the differences in net payoffs between both parties are lower than 
in the upper illustration so that the contractor makes more productive investments in 
order to invest the highest possible amount in unproductive investments. Hence, the 
optimal investment combination is at ( 50; 30)PPPsp PPPspî ê  . 
In the third (lower) illustration of Fig.8 the run of the contractor’s utility is shown when 
the payment 0P  for his service is 0 70P  . Here, his utility function changes to: 
50 0.5* 0.5* 1.5*max{ 20 0.5* 1.5* ,0} 0.6*max{20 0.5* 1.5* ,0}
PPP SPC
U i e i e i e

         
 
From the function term, it can be seen that the psychological effect from advanta-
geous distributional inequality now applies at the point of decision. As we know from 
the analysis in section 4.2.2., the contractor will try to make as many productive in-
vestments as possible. Furthermore, as the psychological influence of productive and 
unproductive investments are effective in opposite directions, the contractor might 
consider making unproductive investments in order to increase the highest possible 
amount of productive investments. If the contractor were only to make productive in-
vestments, then the resulting combination before the vertex of the plane is surpassed 
would be at ( 40; 0)PPPsp PPPspî ê  . However, by investing a small amount in e , the 
contractor can make more productive investments so that he arrives at the optimal 
combination of ( 50 ; 3.3)PPPsp PPPspî ê   for this case. The light blue arrow shows 
again how the optimum is shifted compared to the standard model. Furthermore, the 
total of Fig.8 illustrates the evolution of the optimum by only varying the fixed pay-
ment to the contractor 
0P .  
 
 This last example concludes the analysis of the implications of ownership and social 
preferences in a PPP setting with incomplete contracts. The following section will dis-
cuss the findings of the model presented here in the light of previous findings, par-
ticularly the Hart (2003) model, and add some concluding remarks. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
The analysis presented here provided new insights into the investment behavior of 
economic agents in a PPP setting with contractual incompleteness and social prefer-
ences, some of them being fundamentally different from previous insights from in-
complete contract theory.  
First of all, the analysis revealed that if the contractor in a PPP setting disposes of 
preferences for distributional equality, not only the distribution of ownership rights has 
an influence on the contractor’s investment incentives but also payments. This is due 
to the influence the fixed payment – that is, the price for providing the service – has 
on whether the contractor feels a sense of envy or a sense of guilt. Consequently, 
the public authority can set investment incentives for productive investments in the 
unbundling case as well as in the PPP case. This finding is substantially different 
from the incomplete contract literature in general based on standard (neoclassical) 
theory in which only the distribution of ownership rights has an influence on an eco-
nomic agent’s investment incentives (e.g. Hart 1995).  
The implications of these findings are that by appealing to fairness (e.g. through a 
“gentlemen’s agreement”) and ensuring that the contractor is better off, the public 
authority can induce investment effects in either case, unbundling and PPP. Hence, it 
is important for the public authority to ensure that it has enough funds to make pay-
ment for the contractor’s construction service that makes him better off. In addition, 
the public authority (or the commanding party in general) can further influence the 
invested amount by varying its payments. Hence, if the public authority has complete 
information on the contractor’s preferences and productivity parameters, it can 
choose an ownership form and make a payment so that the socially optimum first-
best is reached, that is, the contractor invests the maximum amount of productive 
investments i  without any unproductive investments e . 
On the contrary, if the public authority can foresee that it will not be able to pay a 
price that favors the contractor, a scenario can be realized in which the contractor 
only makes unproductive investments without any productive investments. This im-
 plies that an envious contractor might use unproductive investments as a measure to 
regulate “unfair” payments from the public authority. This behavior can also be ob-
served in other contexts such as the provision of public goods or international climate 
negotiations. Here, parties might have a lower incentive for unilateral mitigation ef-
forts when they feel they are being exploited by free-riders (e.g. Buchholz et al. 2014; 
Bolle et al. 2015). 
When discussing these insights and the recommendations for action, it has to be 
considered that the model presented here is very simple and the results and recom-
mendations are drawn through a casuistic approach. Nonetheless, the model helps 
to present a first impression of possible effects from social preferences in an incom-
plete contract setting. 
In order to provide further insight on the behavior of economic agents in a decentral-
ized investment scenario, further research could seek to simulate a PPP scenario 
and compare whether the observations in experiments are consistent with the theo-
retical predictions. In addition, these experiments could also serve to assess the 
aversion parameters. Analogous to Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the distribution of pref-
erences could be analyzed according to the experimental results. This assessment in 
turn could be used in order to further develop the theoretical framework for the ana-
lyzed setting. 
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